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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS ANDREWS 
The above entitled cases which all involve the same group 
of wells and springs in Juab County were consolidated for 
trial. The appellants, Orvil Andrews, N eldon V. Andrews, 
R. Delos Andrews, Eldon V erness Andrews, Oral Calvert 
Taylor and Laveda A. Taylor, collectively herein referred to 
as nAndrews," have appealed from the amended decree of 
the District Court of Juab County as it affects all three cases. 
The plaintiffs in Case No. 3 770 will be referred to as the 
nFowkes" and the Current Creek Irrigation Company, plaintiff 
in one case and defendant in each of the others, will be re-
ferred to as the ''Irrigation Company." Reference to the large 
transcript will- be indicated (R. -). Other references will 
specifically designate the document. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Andrews are the owners of what is commonly known 
as the Starr Ranch, consisting of some 2500 acres of land 
located a few miles north of Mona, Utah, of which 323 acres 
are cultivated and irrigated, approximately 200 acres are in 
irrigated and sub-irrigated pasture and the remainder in graz-
ing land. This land lies east of the Mona Reservoir on both 
sides of Highway 91. The Andrews are the owners of the 
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Claim Priority Flow or Water Use Exhibit Production 
,.,,,,,;., 
......... :.>37 flowing well Prior to 1915 20 gpm. stockwatering No . 
'·)38 flowing well Prior to 1915 20 gpm. stockwatering A25 
and domestic 
.. )39 flowing well Prior to 1915 300 gpm. irrigation A25 
. )40 flowing well Prior to 1915 225 gpm. irrigation A25 




21443 March 14, 1950 6 irrigation A26 
(This is the pump well referred to in the testimony.) 
21444 March 14, 1950 6 irrigation A26 
(This application has been approved but well has not been 
drilled.) 
The flowing wells are located several hundred feet apart 
along the west side of state highway 91 immediately north of 
the Andrews dwelling house, and the pump well is located 
approximately 1;2 mile in a southeasterly direction from the 
southernmost well. 
The Andrews are also the owners of a spring located west 
of the home which prior to 1955 flowed approximately 2¥2 
second feet. The water from the spring and the flowing wells 
was used to irrigate 150 acres of land west of the state highway 
in 1954 and in preceding years. The Andrews also own the 
right to use water from numerous seeps and springs in the 
lower meadow land for the irrigation of some 90 acres of 
pasture land. It was ~tipulated that they and their predecessors 
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The Fowkes, whose land is located along the state highway 
immediately north of the Andrews land, are the owners of 
flowing wells represented by water claims 3096, 3097, 3098, 
3099, 3108, 3109, 4392, 4393, 10470, 10471 and 10472, all 
of which are in evidence (Pltf. Ex. 1). In addition they claim 
the right to seeps, springs and sub-irrigation water for pasture 
lands. It was stipulated that the use of this water antedated 
1903. The wells were used for domestic purposes and for the 
irrigation of approximately 115 acres of land. 
The Irrigation Company owns Mona Reservoir and the 
following wells which are located on the Andrews property 
immediately east of the reservoir. 
Well Priority Date Drilled Depth & Size No of Casing 
1. 1951 June 6, 1951 730 feet- 6 inches 
2. 1951 August 6, 1951 580 feet-12 inches 
3. 1951 August 15, 1954 505 feet-12 inches 
4. 1951 December 3, 1954 643 feet-12 inches 
5. 1951 December 24, 1954 510 feet-12 inches 
All of the Irrigation Company's underground water rights 
involved in these suits are based on application 22760 filed in 
the State Engineer's office on April 9, 1951 to appropriate 18 
second feet of water from three wells to be drilled in Sections 
17 and 18, Township 11 South, Range 1 East, SLB&M. Wells 
Nos. 1 and 2 were drilled to a depth of 730 feet and 580 
feet, respectively. The yield of the two wells was disappoint-
ing to the applicant, (R. 161) and on November 18, 1953, 
the Irrigation Company filed application No. a-2786 to change 
the points of diversion fron1 the points of diversion described 
in the original application (none of which were used) to five 
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[i1 
I 
points of diversion in Sections 8, 17 and 18, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East, SLB&M. As indicated above three wells, 
being Nos. 3, 4, and 5, were drilled pursuant to the change 
application in 1954. This change application was approved 
in 1956 by the state engineer and actions for review were filed 
by both Andrews and Fowkes and are included in this litigation. 
On April 7, 1951, two days before filing its underground 
water application mentioned above, officers of the Irrigation 
Cornpany entered into a written agreement with John W. 
Roundy, Sr., and Mina Roundy, his wife, predecessors in 
interest of Andrews, by the terms of which the Roundys 
granted to the Irrigation Company the right to drill and main-
tain one or more artesian wells in designated quarter sections 
west of the Union Pacific right-of-way, and the right to con-
struct an open ditch from each of the wells to the Mona Res-
ervoir. The consideration for the grant was the right to use 
water from each well at times when the reservoir was full or 
nearly so. 
On June 25, 1951, the same parties entered into another 
agreement the same as the first, except that it provided for the 
drilling of the wells in the SW14 of Section 8, Township 11 
South, Range 1 East, instead of in Sections 17 and 18 of the 
same Township as provided in the contract of April 7th. These 
agreements are designated "Pit£' s Ex. C and D", and were 
received in evidence in case No. 3 763. 
The Irrigation Company drilled two wells designated Nos. 
1 and 2 in June and August, 1951, pursuant to the agreements 
set out above but at different locations than those authorized 
in the agreements. The wells were permitted to flow con-
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tinuously, winter and summer, from 1951, when they were 
drilled until 1955, when they were temporarily closed for 
experimental purposes. 
The well referred to above, and in the record, as the 
ccAndrews Pump Well," with a priority of 1950, was drilled 
in 1951 and was pumped each summer for irrigation purposes 
thereafter (R. 245-246). It produced approximately six second 
feet. According to the testimony of Mr. Roundy, the continuous 
flowing of the two Irrigation Company wells and the summer 
operation of his large pump well for irrigation of land east 
of the highway and at a higher elevation than the large spring 
near the house, and the Andrews and Fowkes flowing wells, 
did not adversely affect the flows of such spring and wells. 
In fact, he said that ~he irrigation of the higher land increased 
their flows (R. 244-248). 
On November 2, 1953, the Irrigation Company made a 
third contract with the Roundys, similar in form to the previous 
two contracts, except that it contained a new paragraph as 
follows: 
''It is known and understood by the parties hereto 
that the parties of the first part have fl~wing we~ls ~£ 
their own on adjoining property and desue to mamtam 
the present flow from said wells if possibl~ to do so. 
It is not known "Thether or not the "Tells "yhtch may be 
dug or driven pursuant to the authority of this ~gree­
ment will affect the flo"T fron1 the "Tells heretn re-
ferred to and now O\vned by first parties. THEREFO~, 
it is further specifically agreed bet,veen the parties 
hereto that if, after the drilling or driving of any well 
authorized by this agreement, the flow in any one or 
more of first parties' "rells is diminished, each party 
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hereto will choose a competent engineer and the two 
so chosen will, with the assistance of the Utah State 
Engineer, determine or have a determination made as 
to whether the driving and using of any well author-
ized hereby has affected or diminished the flow in 
first parties' wells. In the event it should be so deter-
mined that the flow in first parties' wells has been 
diminished by any well drilled or driven under author-
ity of this agreement, said three engineers will asssess 
an amount of damages which in their opinion first 
parties have suffered or will suffer by reason thereof, 
and second party will then pay such damages to first 
parties, or in the alternative will immediately cap and 
discontinue the use of any such well so drilled here-
d ,, un er. 
The third contract also designated additional areas where 
one or more wells could be drilled. See De£' s Ex. 1, Case No. 
3763. 
Pursuant to this third contract, the Irrigation Company 
drilled Well No. 3 in August, 1954, and Wells Nos. 4 and 
5, in December 1954. The wells produced a large flow of water 
and were permitted to flow without interruption during the 
winter of 1954-55 and spring of 1955. It will be noted by an 
examination of Pit£. Ex. P. 13 these wells are perforated to get 
water from nearly every water bearing strata. The effect of the 
flow of these three wells was immediately noticeable (R. 249) . 
The flows of the Andrews wells got smaller each time they 
were checked and the South well stopped flowing entirely in 
February. The next one to the North stopped npretty close 
to the 1st of March" (R. 249). In the latter part of May, 1955, 
the last of the Andrews flowing wells stopped flowing (R. 264). 
None of the wells flowed again up to the time of trial (R. 
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265) · The large spring near the house gradually diminished 
in flow during the spring and summer of 1955, and it stopped 
flowing entirely in the latter part of July (R. 266) (Tr. Case 
No. 3 763, pp. 16-17). 
The Andrews operated their pump on the 5th and 6th 
of July, 1955, and then closed down until about July 24th; 
from which date they pumped without much interruption until 
the fall (R. 268). 
During the period from November, 1955, to June, 1956, 
the state engineer and the U. S. Geological Survey made a 
study to determine whether there was any direct relationship 
between the Irrigation Company wells, the Andrews pump 
well and the flowing wells along Highway 91. Many measure-
ments were made, and the results of opening and closing the 
wells are shown graphically on Pltfs' Exhibits 6A, 6B and 
P8. See testimony of Mr. Mayo for the details (R. 30-31) 
(Tr. Case No. 3 763, pp. 20-46). The pumping of the Andrews 
well and the flowing of the Irrigation Company wells lowers 
the pressure in the flowing wells. 
In the summer of 1956, the Andrews spring was dry, the 
flowing wells were dry and the Andre\\·s pasture was drying up. 
The Andrews thereupon closed the Irrigation Company wells 
and notified the Irrigation Con1pany officials to keep the com-
pany wells closed or to par danlages as provided by the 195 3 
agreement (Tr. Case No. 376.1. pp. 9-12). 
Irrigation Con1 puny z·. Orz,il Andreu's-Case No. 3 763. 
In July, 1956, the Irrigation Con1pany filed Civil Action 
No. 5 763 alleging that Orvil Andrews had unlawfully closed 
10 
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their wells and would keep them closed unless the court entered 
an order permanently enjoining him from molesting the wells 
and from interfering with their operation and maintenance by 
the plaintiff. After a hearing on an order to show cause, the 
trial court granted an injunction pendente lite upon the posting 
of a surety bond in the amount of $2500.00 and the Irrigation 
Company wells were permitted to flow. 
An amended complaint was filed thereafter, joining all 
of the appellants. An answer was filed denying the material 
allegations of the complaint and pleading the agreement dated 
November 2, 1953, between the Roundys and the Irrigation 
Company, the offer of the defendants to comply with the 
paragraph quoted above, the selection of an engineer and the 
demand that the plaintiff do likewise. The answer also alleged, 
among other things, that the Andrews had prior water rights 
in the underground basin which had been impaired by the 
drilling and operation of the plaintiff's wells. 
Andrews v. Irrigation Company-Case No. 3768 
The Irrigation Company application No. 22760, under 
which its wells were drilled, sought to appropriate 18 second 
feet of water from underground sources. The points of diver-
sion described in paragraph 7 are in Sections 17 and 18. After 
two wells were drilled and the flow was found to be below 
expectations, the Irrigation Company filed application No. 
a-2786 to change the points of diversion to five points therein 
described, some of which are closer to the Andrews wells 
and nearer the mountains (Pltfs.' Ex. B). The change applica-
tion was protested by Fowkes and Andrews but was approved 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
by the state engineer, subject to existing rights, more than one 
year after the 1rrigation Company wells were drilled. The 
Andrews filed this suit under Section 73-3-14, U.C . ..A .... 1953, 
to review the decision of the state engineer. 
Fowkes v. Irrigation Company, Andrews, Utah Water and 
Power Board, and the State Engineer-Case No. 3770 
This suit was filed to enjoin the Irrigation Company and 
the Andrews from further diverting water by means of their 
respective wells or from interfering with the Fowkes' <(under-
ground water sources of supply," and to recover actual and 
punitive damages. A third cause of action is for review of the 
decision of the state engineer approving Change Application 
No. a-2786. 
The Andrews filed an answer to the complaint alleging 
that the interference with the Fowkes wells was caused by 
excessive and wrongful diversions by the Irrigation Company. 
They also filed a cross-claim against the Irrigation Company 
seeking ( 1) an adjudication of the water rights of all parties, 
( 2) injunctive relief, ( 3) administrative action to prevent fur-
ther interference, and ( 4) damages. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND DECREE 
The findings of fact describe generally the water rights 
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First Priority Springs 
Second Priority Flowing Wells 
Third Priority Andrews Applications 
Fourth Priority Irrigation Company Application 
This is followed by findings as to the protesting of the 
Irrigation Company change application No. a-2786, amending 
its application No. 22760. 
The following important findings are quoted: 
((12. That the drilling and use of water from the 
Andrews pump well and from the Irrigation Company 
wells have interferred with and have interrupted the 
flow of water from the eighteen flowing wells described 
in paragraph three hereof and the springs described 
in paragraph six hereof and have reduced the pressure 
in said flowing wells and in said springs to the point 
that effective future use thereof will require the in-
stallation of pumps or other means ot securing the 
water therefrom. 
13. That there is unappropriated water within the 
area and that the action of the State Engineer in ap-
proving the Andrews Applications Nos. 21443 and 
21444 and the Irrigation Company's Applications Nos. 
22760 and a-2786 was proper and that the statutory 
requirements of approval were complied with by the 
applicants in each instance. 
15. That Andrews has failed to sustain the burden of 
proof to show the net effect of the interference caused 
to his flowing wells and spring by the Irrigation Com-
pany as opposed to and distinguished from the effect 
caused by his own pump well; and that Andrews has 
failed to show any measurable intereference between 
the Irrigation Company wells and his pump well. 
17. That all matters as to administration and distri-
bution of water are by statute vested in the State En-
13 
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''-!. 
gineer and no one has the right or the authority to 
underta~e to open or to close any well without the 
express permission of the said State Engineer.'' 
Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court concluded 
( 1) that in Case No. 3763 the Irrigation Company was en-
titled to a decree enjoining the Andrews from in any way 
interfering with its wells; (2) that in Case No. 3768, the Irri-
gation Company was entitled to a decree affirming the action 
of the state engineer in approving Application No. 22760 
and Change Application No. a-2768 and (3) that in Case 
No. 3 770, the Fowkes are entitled to a decree requiring the 
defendants in that case to replace to Fowkes, during the 
irrigation season, 1.775 second feet of water at their wells 
·'on the surface of the ground'' and sufficient water at their 
springs to irrigate 10 acres of land, and we quote, "that such 
replacement of water shall be undiminished in quantity and 
quality for the purpose heretofore used and the cost of such 
replacement shall be borne equally by the Irrigation Company 
and Andrews ... n (emphasis added). Replacement of 27.11 
gallons per minute \vas ordered during the non-irrigation 
season. 
The Court then concluded that the Fo\Ykes \Vere entitled 
to a decree enjoining the Irrigation Company and Andrews 
from diverting or using \Yater under their respective applica-
tions from and after April L 1957. ~~unless and until replace-
ment of water is made as ordered . . . " 
It Jhould be noted that tbe court nzade no finding U'hat-
tlJeJ' reJf'ccting tbf! u·rilh'JJ ugreeJJh'lltJ betu·een the Roundys 
and the Irrigt~lion CoJnpt111J' (Defs Ex. L Case No. 3763), 
14 
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the performance of the agreements by the Roundys, and the 
violation thereof by the Irrigation Company. The Court also 
ignored the fact that the Andrews spring had a first priority 
and that all Andrews rights were prior to the Irrigation 
Company wells in making its order requiring replacement. 
These omissions, which are of vital concern to the Andrews, 
will be discussed at length under appropriate headings. 
The decree follows the conclusions practically verbatim. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Irrigation Company v. Andrews-No. 3763 
1. The Court failed to make findings on all material 
tssues. 
a. The Court made no findings respecting the Roundy 
contracts requiring the Irrigation Company to pay damages or 
close its wells in the event of interference with the Andrews 
wells. 
b.· 'The Court ignored the plain provisions of the 1953 
Roundy contract respecting the method of determining inter-
ference and fixing damages. 
2. The Court erred in holding that the Andrews had the 
burden of proof of interference with their prior rights. 
3. The Court erred in making finding of fact No. 15 that 
the Andrews had failed to sustain the burden of proof to 
show interference with their spring and flowing wells. 
1 5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Andrews v. Irrigation Company-No. 3768 
1. The Court failed to make findings of fact on the only 
material issue in the case, namely, as to whether the approval 
of Change li.pplication No. a-2786 would impair the Andrews 
water rights. 
2. The evidence shows the proposed change impairs 
vested rights, and therefore Change Application No. a-2786 
should be rejected. 
Fowkes v. Irrigation Company-No. 3770 
1. The Court ignored Andrews legal rights established 
by contract. 
2. The Court disregarded the Andrews priority, and in 
time of shortage refused to order the Irrigation Company 
wells closed. 
3. The burden \Yas on the Irrigation Company to show 
that its \Yells did not dry up the springs and \veils of the prior 
users. 
4. The Court erred in making finding No. 15 that the 
Irrigation Con1pany \Yells have not measurably interfered with 
the Andre,vs springs and \veils. 
5. The Court erred in striking testimony as to the waste-
fulness of the Irrigation Company's use of \\'ater. 
6. The Court's nsolution" to the problern presented was 
arbitrary, incon1plete and "rholly ineffectual. 
16 
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ARGUMENT 
ilit: Irrigation Company v. Andrews, No. 3 763 
:4ff I. THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF 
~~~ FACT ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES. 
The principal issue in this case was whether the Andrews 
'':~ had unlawfully closed the Irrigation Company wells, all of 
~·' 
iw 
which are located on the Andrews land. This issue was raised 
by the answer to the amended complaint in which the contracts 
between Roundy and the Irrigation Company, Exhibits 1, C 
and D in Case No. 3 763 were pleaded. Particular reference 
is made to the contract dated November 2, 1953, (Def's. Ex. 
1) which as stated above provides that if after the drilling 
or driving of any well authorized by this agreement, the flow 
in any one or more of First Parties' wells (Andrews wells) 
is diminished each party will choose an engineer and the two 
chosen with the assistance of the Utah state engineer would 
determine the question of interference and assess the damages. 
The contract then provides: 
(C ••• and the Second Party will then pay such dam-
ages to First Parties, or in the alternative will im-
mediately cap and discontinue the use of any such well 
drilled thereunder.'' 
It is then pleaded in the answer that the Andrews had 
offered to name an engineer and to otherwise comply with 
the provisions of the agreement referred to above, and had 
demanded that the Irrigation Company do likewise. The Irri-
gation Company refused to comply. 
The material issue as to the right of the Irrigation Com-
pany to operate its flowing wells in violation of the 195 3 
contract was entirely disregarded by the Court. No findings 
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of fact were made on the subject. This was reversible error. 
In the case of Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673, the 
Court said: 
celt . is ~he duty of the trial court to find upon all 
matenal _1ssues raised by the pleadings and the failure 
to do so 1s reversible error. Mitchell v. Jensen, 29 Utah, 
346, 81 P. 165; Everett v. Jones, 32 Utah, 489, 91 P. 
360; Dillon Imp. Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah, 1, 88 P. 
670; Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah, 242, 137 P. 937; Snyder 
v. Allen, 51 Utah, 291, 169 P. 945; Hillyard v. Dist. 
Court (Utah) 249 P. 806." 
It is, of course, elementary that parties may contract re-
specting the right of one to enter upon the land of another 
and to drill wells thereon. The right may be made conditional 
as in this case, and upon the happening of a specified condi-
tion the right of entry and use may, by the terms of the contract 
be revoked. Upon the failure of the Irrigation Company to 
comply with the contract, the right of the Company to operate 
the wells ceased, and the Andrews were entitled to the capping 
of the wells. The Andrews had a clear right by contract to 
close the wells. It was the plain duty of the trial court to 
recognize and to enforce the 195 3 contract. 
2. THE IRRIGATION COMPANY HAD THE BUR-
DEN OF PROOF OF NON-INTERFERENCE WITH AN-
DREWS WELLS. 
The trial court took the position throughout the trial of 
this case that the Andrews could not prevail unless they proved 
that the operation of the Irrigation Company flowing wells 
had caused interference "' ith the Andre\vs \veils and spring, 
and bou' JJ/Itcb interference. The court's position is n1ade clear 
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t in this regard by finding of fact No. 15 to the effect that 
Andrews had failed to sustain the burden of proof rrto show 
the net effect of the interference caused to his flowing wells 
~·: and spring by the Irrigation Company ... " The Court made 
the finding despite the facts: 
1. The Irrigation Company was the plaintiff, and, there-
fore, normally had the burden of proof, and 
2. The priorities of the Andrews spring and wells were 
admittedly earlier than the priorities of the Irrigation Com-
pany wells. 
The situation of the Irrigation Company, the later appro-
priator from the underground basin, was precisely the same 
as one who attempts to develop a water source near an appro-
priated stream or spring. The Irrigation Company had the 
burden of proof that it was not taking water belonging to 
the prior appropriators. For a discussion of this well-settled 
principle, see Bastian v. Nebeker, 49 Utah 390, 163 P. 1092. 
In that case Nebeker had a right to the use of the water of a 
certain spring area. Bastian later drilled wells in the vicinity 
of the springs, which reduced the flow of water from the springs 
and the question arose as to the extent of interference. Bastian 
brought suit against Nebeker to enjoin him from interfering 
with the wells. The trial court made a finding that 84 7-8 per 
cent was ( (new water'' developed by the wells, and decreed 
the water accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed the case 
pointing out that Nebeker had the burden of proof as to the 
extent of interference. We quote: 
"It is settled law in this jurisdiction that where a 
party goes upon a stream at or near its source, the 
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waters of which have been appropriated and are being 
used by others for b,enefi.cia~ purposes, and intercepts 
or taps a subterranean flow or body of water and diverts 
any substantial flow therefrom which he claims to be 
de~eloped water, the burden is upon him to show by 
s~tlsfactor.Y proof that the water so intercepted and 
dtverted 1s (developed water.' Mountain Lake Min. 
Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., 47 Utah 346, 149 Pac. 929. 
And where, as in the case at bar, it is shown by indis-
putable evidence that the water claimed to be developed 
water is drawn from the same underground flow or 
bo_dy of water that wholly or partially feeds and sup-
phes the springs from which the prior appropriator 
obtains his water, the subsequent appropriator, the 
party claiming to have developed water, should be re-
quired to show by clear, positive, and convincing evi-
dence that the water claimed by him is developed water. 
Mountain Lake Min. Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., supra, 
and cases there cited.' " 
The Court then made the following significant comments: 
CCThe evidence in this case, as the record now stands, 
regarding the effect that a continuous and uninter-
rupted flow of the wells would eventually have upon 
the flow of water from the springs is, as stated, a 
matter for conjecture and theory only. The plaintiff, 
therefore, did not support his claim that 84 Ys per 
cent. of the \Vater flowing from the wells is, as found 
by the court, developed '\Yater, by that quantum of ev~­
dence required in cases of this kind. The proof on thts 
point, as the record nO\Y stands, furnishes ~s sound 
a basis for concluding that a continuous, ununpeded 
flow of water fron1 the \Yells, for a considerable period 
of tin1e, would materially reduce the flow of the springs 
below the lowest point shown by the measurements 
made by Anderson, if it did not entirely dry up the 
springs, as it does for concluding that it \YOuld not 
reduce the flow of the spring \Vater belo\Y \Yhat it ·was 
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when the measurements were made. The court there-
fore erred in making the finding of fact last referred to. 
The trial court, by appointing some person, familiar 
with the rules for measuring water, to measure the 
water flowing from the spring and seeps at intervals 
for a reasonable length of time while the wells are 
plugged and then make measurements at intervals 
for a considerable length of time when the wells are 
flowing at their full capacity, ought to be able to deter-
mine approximately the amount of developed water, if 
any, that flows from the wells. Should the trial court on 
retrying the case make an order that further measure-
ments and tests be made to determine the amount of 
developed water, if any, produced by the wells, the 
entire expense of such measurements and tests should 
be borne by the plaintiff, because, as stated, the burden 
is on him to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the water claimed by him is developed water.'' 
We have quoted at length from the Bastian case because 
it is so closely in point on the facts. In that case, as in our case, 
the well owner brought the suit for an injunction and had 
a later priority than the spring owner. It was also clear in 
that case, as in ours, that when the wells were flowing they 
interfered with the flow of water from the spring. The Supreme 
Court recognized that in cases of this nature where the facts 
as to the water supply and extent of interference are difficult 
and expensive to ascertain, the burden of proof and all expense 
of ascertainment should be on the late comer. The trial court 
erred in departing from this sound and well-settled rule. 
3. TI-IE IRRIGATION COMPANY WELLS DRILLED 
IN 1954 CAUSED THE INTERFERENCE. 
The trial court's finding No. 15 that the Andrews had 
failed to sustain the burden of proof to show the net effect of 
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the interference to his flowing wells caused by the Irrigation 
Company as opposed to; and distinguished from the effect 
caused by his own pump well; and that Andrews has failed to 
show any "measurable interference" between the Irrigation 
Company wells and his pump well is not supported by the 
evidence. On the contrary, the evidence shows that until the 
three wells were drilled by the Irrigation Company in 1954, 
and were allowed to flow uncontrolled during the fall and 
winter of 1954-195 5 there had been no interference with the 
Roundy (Andrews) and Fowkes springs and wells (R. 122-
123). 
The undisputed evidence is that the flowing wells of the 
Andrews and Fowkes showed no noticeable decrease in flow 
after the drilling of the first two Irrigation Company wells 
in 1951, and until Wells 3, 4, and 5 were drilled in 1954 
(R. 245-247) o 
This was the case despite the fact that the Andrews pump 
well was operated as follows: 
1951 1Y2 months (R. 245-246) o 
1952 3 months (Ro 245-246). 
1953 3 months (Trans. 10-3-56, p. 103). 
1954 From May to November (Trans. 10-3-56, p. 103) 
In fact, Mr. Roundy testified that during the summer of 
1953, when Irrigation Company wells Nos. 1 and 2 were flow-
ing and the Andrews pump well had been in operation for 
three months, the Andrews spring near the house increased 
its flow to the extent that he had to release water from his 
pond about twice as frequently as before (R. 246). The flow-
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ing wells also increased their flow. He irrigated 150 acres of 
land from the spring and flow wells above the tracks, and 
about 90· acres below the tracks were subbed and irrigated 
from seeps and springs in the lower pasture (R. 247). 
The Irrigation Company well No. 3 was completed on 
August 15, 1954, and wells Nos. 4 and 5 were completed in 
December, 1954. The effect on the Andrews spring near the 
house and on the Andrews flowing wells was immediate! y 
noticeable (R. 249). All of the Andrews flowing wells ceased 
to flou; in 1955 before Andrews pump well was operated. 
Andrews pumped on July 23, 1955 (R. 263-264). Pumping 
continued until October, 195 5, when the pump was turned off 
for the winter. Mr. Mayo testified that on October 3rd, 1955, 
none of the Andrews wells were flowing, and nevertheless the 
Irrigation Company wells were left open during the winter 
season (Tr. 10-3-56, p. 48). The Andrews wells have not 
flowed since the last ones dried up in the spring of 195 5 (R. 
265). The spring dried up in July, 195 5, and has never come 
back (R. 267). In the winter of 1954-5 5 spring and early 
sun1mer of 195 5 when the spring and wells stopped flowing, 
the Andrews pump well was not in operation, and the Irri-
gation Company wells were flowing. 
In view of the foregoing, it is manifest that the trial 
court's finding that the Andrews had failed to show the ((net 
effect" of the interference caused to the flowing wells and the 
pump well by the Irrigation Company wells, is not supported 
by the evidence. The "net effect" of the flowing of the Irri-
gation Company wells was to dry up the Andre\vs spring and 
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flowing wells and to lower the water in the pump well fro1:ll 
68 to 83 feet (R. 275). 
Andrews vs. Irrigation Company, No. 3768) 
1. THE COURT FAILED TO MAkE FINDINGS ON THE 
ONLY MATERIAL ISSUE IN THE CASE. 
This is an action to review the decision of the state engi-
neer approving Application No. a-2786 filed by the Irrigation 
Company for permanent change of point of diversion, place 
and nature of use of water. The application was intended to 
amend the Irrigation Company application No. 22760 (which 
as stated above was filed to appropriate 1.8 second feet of 
water from three wells) to permit the diversion of water by 
means of five wells. The relative locations of the Andrews 
wells and the Irrigation Company wells are shown on the map, 
Plaintiffs Exhibit B in Case No. 3 763. It will be noted from 
Exhibit B that the Irrigation Company wells Nos. 3 and 4, 
drilled in August and December 1954, are located approxi-
mately one-half mile west of the Andrews group of flowing 
wells and a little less than one mile westerly from the Andrews 
pump well. It should also be noted that well No. 3 which on 
October 3, 195 5 .flowed 1125 gallons per minute was actually 
drilled about one-half mile south of the point described in 
the change application. 
It is alleged in the complaint that since the drilling and 
operation of the five Irrigation Company \Yells covered by the 
change application the underground basin supplying the 
Andrews wells has been substantially lowered, the pressure of 
water therein has dropped, the Andrews flowing wells have 
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ceased to flow, the water in the pump well has been lowered 
to a depth in excess of 100 feet, the Andrews springs and seeps 
have ceased to flow and the Andrews lands previously sub-
irrigated are now dry. It is further alleged that the approval 
of change application ((will impair and destroy plaintiffs' prior 
underground water right and will constitute an enlargement of 
the defendants' rights. 
The law is well settled that in an action such as this, to 
review a decision of the state engineer on a change application, 
the only issue is whether there is reason to believe that the 
proposed change can be made without impairing the vested 
rights of other appropriators from the same source. See United 
States v. District Court, 121 U. 1, 238 P. 2d 1132; Salt Lake 
City v. Boundary Springs Water Users' Ass'n., 2 U. 2d. 141, 
270 P. 2d 453. 
It is recognized that an appropriator's right to change 
the point of diversion, place and nature of use is not absolute 
or a vested right, but is only conditional since no such change 
can be made if the public, or any other appropriator, prior 
or subsequent, is adversely affected. United States v. Caldwell, 
64 U. 490, 231 P. 434. 
It is also settled that a change applicant cannot increase 
the amount of water diverted and consumed after he makes his 
appropriation by a change of point of diversion or place or 
manner of use, and thereby deprive other appropriators from 
the same source of water to which they are entitled. East Bench 
Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 U. 2d 170, 271 P. 2d 449, 456. 
Another corollary to the fundamentals referred to above 
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is that an applicant seeking a change cannot take more water 
from the new point of diversion than there was available at 
the old point. Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 
104 U. 202, 135 P. 2d 108. 
It is clear from the foregoing that the issue of ((reason 
to believe'' the change would not impair existing water rights 
is the only material issue in this action to review the state 
engineer's decision. There is no finding on this issue. The 
court completly ignored it. This is reversible error. See Baker 
v. Hatch, supra, and other cases on this point cited above. 
2. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE CHANGE IM-
p AIRS VESTED RIGHTS. 
The instant case is unique in that the applicant actually 
made the proposed changes and operated its wells for a period 
of more than one year before the state engineer approved the 
change application. In the ordinary case, the applicant and 
the state engineer observe the plain provisions of section 
73-3-3, U.C.A. 1953, which expressly forbid the making of a 
permanent change of point of diversion without approval of 
a change application. In fact, any person who changes, or 
who attempts to change, such rights without approval is guilty 
of a misdemeanor. But in this case, for some reason not appear-
ing in the record, the Irrigation Company made the change 
before approval of its application. 
In the ordinary case, the state engineer and the Court, in 
case of appeal, are obliged to speculate to some extent on 
the effect of the proposed change and to determine whether 
there is "reason to believep or \Cprobable cause to believe," 
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that the \Vater can be diverted at the new point of diversion 
without impairing the rights of others. In this case, the evidence 
is conclusive that the flowing of the three wells drilled in 1954 
caused the Andrews spring and flowing wells to cease flowing 
during the winter of 1954-1955, and the spring and early 
summer of 195 5, before the operation of the Andrews pump 
well began (July 23, 1955, see R. 249-264). The reason the 
t\vo vvells drilled in 1951 by the Irrigation Company did not 
adversely affect the Andrews springs and wells, and the wells 
drilled in 1954 at the new point of diversion did affect them, 
is apparent from a study of the testimony of David I. Gardner 
and George H. Hanson, and from the maps in evidence. Wells 
Nos. 3 and 4 are nearer the mountains than the original wells, 
they are in coarser water bearing material and they are closer 
to the Andrews springs and wells. See (R. 40, 162, 170-175) 
for testimony supporting the above assertion. The applicant 
made the change application for the obvious purpose of in-
creasing the flow from the basin. The equally obvious result 
was that the increased withdrawal of water lowered the water 
table and pressure, and dried up the springs and wells having 
earlier priorities. In order to hold that there has been no im-
pairment,t his Court would have to hold either ( 1) that the 
Andrews had no vested water rights in the springs or flowing 
wells or ( 2) that the drilling and operation of the three wells 
at the new points of diversion was not a cause of the drying 
up of the Andrews springs and wells. 
A holding that the Andrews had no vested right in the 
flow of springs and wells could not be made without over-
turning the fundamental water law of the state. All water 
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sources are, at some point in their development, either springs 
or seeps in the case of surface streams or are underground 
water, either flowing freely or under pressure. It was stipulated 
that the Andrews' predecessors had used the waters of the 
springs for irrigation since prior to 1903 (R. 118). No ques-
tions of title to the water rights are involved. 
As pointed out elsewhere in this brief, the cause of the 
drying up of the springs and wells is certain. The three Irri-
gation Company wells were drilled and allowed to flow 
throughout the winter of 1954-1955 when the Andrews pump 
well was not operated. The spring and wells started drying 
up in January and February and all Andrews springs and 
flowing wells were dry before the operation of the pump well 
began. The only change in the area was the winter flowing of 
the Irrigation Company wells; and, it is, therefore, reasonable 
to assume that the change was at least a cause of the inter-
ference. These facts would require a finding of impairment 
of existing rights and rejection of Application No. a-2786. 
The state engineer should be directed by this Court to reject 
the application. 
Fowkes v. Current Ct·eek Ir,-igation Conzpany, et al., No. 3770 
The following points have been discussed in connection 
with the other two cases, and such discussion is incorporated 
by reference in our argument in this case. 
1. The Court ignored Andrews legal rights established 
by contract. 
3. The burden \vas on the Irrigation Cotnpany to show 
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that its wells did not dry up the springs and wells of the prior 
users. 
4. The Court erred in making finding No. 15 that the 
Irrigation Company wells have not measureably interfered 
with the Andrews springs and wells. 
The remaining points will be discussed in the order stated. 
2. THE COURT DISREGARDED THE ANDREWS 
PRIORITY AND IN TIME OF SHORTAGE REFUSED TO 
ORDER THE IRRIGATION COMPANY WELLS CLOSED. 
It should take no argument to demonstrate that the appro-
priative doctrine applies to all of the waters of the state, surface 
and underground, including the underground water in the 
vicinity of the Starr Ranch in Juab County. But the trial court 
in this case seemed to think that the only application of the 
doctrine was to the Fowkes wells and springs. Although no 
distinction in priority was made between the Andrews springs 
and wells and the Fowkes springs and wells, relief was granted 
to Fowkes and denied to Andrews. In effect, the court held 
there were only two priorities involved: 
First-Fowkes 
Second-All others 
The court ordered replacement of water at the surface 
of the Fovv-kes wells and at their springs, but made no order 
whatever respecting the replacement of water in the Andrews 
springs and wells. For all intents and purposes, the priorities 
of the Andrews and the Irrigation Company were the same 
in the eyes of the court. The fundamentals of the water law 
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respecting pr1or1ty and administration of water rights were 
completley disregarded in the Amended Decree. 
Section 73-1-1 Utah Code, 1953, provides: 
Waters declared property of public. - All waters 
in this state, whether above or under the ground are 
?ereby declared to be the property of the public, sub-
Ject to all existing rights to to the use thereof. 
This Court held in the cases of W rathall v. Johnson, 86 
Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755; Justeson v. Olson, 86 Utah 158, 40 P. 
2d 802, and Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P. 
2d 255, that the doctrine of appropriation is applicable to 
underground water as well as to surface water. Extensive 
amendments to the water laws of Utah have been made since 
the decisions in the Wrathall and Justeson cases to adapt them 
to underground water, and several important sections have been 
added relating only to underground water. 
Attention is invited to the following provisions of sec-
tion 73-5-1 and section 73-5-3. 
73-5-1 ... In addition to the power granted the 
state engineer to appoint water commissioners for the 
distribution of water as provided herein, the state engi-
neer is hereby authorized upon his own motion at any 
time to hold a hearing, or upon a petition signed by 
not less than one-third of the users of underground 
waters in any area as shall be defined by the state 
engineer, he shall hold such hearing, to determine 
whether the underground water supply within such 
area is adequate for the existing claims. Notice of su~ 
hearing shall be given in a form and manner which m 
the judgment of the state engineer will best suit local 
conditions. Upon such hearing the state engineer is 
authorized to make full investigation and findings 
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thereon. If it be found the water supply is inadequate 
for existing claims, he shall divide, or cause to ~e 
divided, by the water commissioner or water commis-
sioners as provided in this section, the waters within 
such area among the several claimants entitled thereto 
in accordance with the rights of each respectively. 
73-5-3-Control by engineer of division and distribu-
tion under judgments.-The state engineer and his duly 
authorized assistants shall carry into effect the judg-
ments of the courts in relation to the division, distri-
bution or use of water under the provisions of this 
title. The state engineer shall divide, or cause to be 
divided, the water within any district created under 
the provisions of this title among the several appro-
priators entitled thereto in accordance with the right 
of each respectively, and shall regulate and control, 
or cause to be regulated and controlled, the use of 
such water by such closing or partial closing of the 
head gates, caps, valves or other controlling works of 
any ditch, canal, pipe, flume, well or tunnel or other 
means of diversion as will prevent the waste of water 
or its use in excess of the quantity to which any appropri-
ator is lawfully entitled, and shall regulate, or cause to 
be regulated, the controlling works of reservoirs in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this title. . . . 
The elementary rule applicable to surface water is that 
when there is not sufficient water in a stream to supply all 
rights, the rights will be cut off in the inverse order of priority. 
This principle is stated in section 73-3-21 as follows: 
Appropriators shall have priority among themselves 
according to the dates of their respective appropria-
tions, so that each appropriator shall be entitled to 
receive his whole supply before any subsequent appro-
priator shall have any right ... 
This statute is applicable to underground water as well 
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as to surface water, and if there is not enough water for all 
rights on a source the last priority must be cut. If there is still 
not enough water, the next priority shall be cut, and so forth 
until the prior rights receive a full supply. There is no question 
but that the law must be followed in this as well as in other 
cases. The obvious difficulty with underground water cases 
is that there must be a showing as to the quantity of water 
available, to determine when and if rights should be cut. This 
is easy in the case of surface water. It can be measured. There 
are only two approaches to determine whether withdrawals 
of underground water are within the annual recharge, or will 
result in Hmining" the supply. One is a study of the effect 
on the water table of measured withdrawals, and the other is 
to theorize. If the first approach is applied to this case it is 
apparent that the steady lowering of the water table indicates 
that with the year around operation of the Irrigation Com-
pany flowing wells the out go exceeds the annual recharge. 
The evidence available indicates, however, that with the 
pumping of the Andrews well in the summer, and even with 
the Irrigation Company wells Nos. 1 and 2 running continu-
ously from 1951 to 1954, there was no noticeable impairment 
of the rights prior in time to the Irrigation Company rights. 
This evidence is undisputed in the record. It was not until 
the last three Irrigation Company wells were allowed to run 
through the winter of 1954-1955 that the Andrews and Fowkes 
wells ceased to flow. 
A study of the engineering data in this case, and par-
ticularly of the hydrographs, exhibits 5 and PS, indicate that 
with the Irrigation Company wells flowing the year around, the 
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
withdrawals were exceeding the annual recharge and under 
the statute the court should have ordered priorities shut off in 
inverse order until a balance occurred. 
Exhibit 5 shows the pressure of the Fowkes well No. 3099 
from 1936 to 1955. After the drilling of the Irrigation Com-
pany wells, the pressure has been as follows: 
December 1952-11lf2 feet above measuring point 
December 1953- 8!6 feet above measuring point 
December 1954- 21;2· feet below measuring point 
October 1955- 31.Q feet below measuring point 
Exhibit 8 shows depth to water in Andrews well No. 
10639. 
December 15, 1955-2lf2 feet below measuring point 
April 15, 1956 -21f2 feet below measuring point 
June 10, 1956 -5 feet below measuring point 
August 30, 1956 -8 feet below measuring point 
All of the hydrographs in evidence shows that with the 
year around draft, resulting from the uncontrolled flow of 
the Irrigation Company wells, there is no ((build up" of the 
basin at any time of the year. During the ordinary ((recharge 
period" in the late fall, winter and early spring when no 
water was being used for irrigation there was no ((build up" 
(Tr. 10-3-56, pp. 49-54). The water was draining out into 
Mona Reservoir, there to be largely lost by evaporation. This 
indicates that the Irrigation Company wells ((mined" water 
from the basin. If the court had been following the funda-
mentals of the appropriative doctrine, the decree would have 
directed the cutting of later priorities in inverse order to the 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is an absolute necessity in this case that there be a 
continued study of the underground water basin, and that 
orders be made by the state engineer from time to time to 
conserve water and to protect the rights of the prior appro-
priator. This has been standard practice for more than half a 
century on surface streams where fluctuating flows require day 
to day measurements to assure orderly distribution, and it is 
no less a necessity on an underground basin where fluctuations 
are just as important and the facts are more difficult to ascer-
tain. There must be flexibility in control just as in the case 
of surface water. Thus far the studies of the basin do not 
indicate any stability, and there is no likelihood that any 
permanent order as to use would settle matters for all time. 
As indicated above, withdrawals should not exceed the 
annual recharge. No one knows, as yet, what that is, and as 
indicated by Dr. Hanson and Mr. Mayo it will take further 
study to find out. If excessive water withdrawals are per-
mitted, the elevation of ground water will drop year after 
year until the water rights and in fact the farms are destroyed. 
The theory (and it is pure theory) discussed by Justice Latimer 
in the case of Hanson v. Salt Lake Gty, supra, that a basin 
should be developed by dra\ving water to the limit of {(eco-
nomic lift" is unsow1d and contrary to law. It u·ould permit 
late conJers to rr nzine" a block of u·ater only once_. and unless 
withdrawals are reduced to a point below the annual recharge 
the basin will never recover. The net result will be that the 
water in the ground \Yhich permitted artesian flow, and reason-
able pu1np lifts '"ill be gone and the property rights of the 
owners of prior rights will be destroyed. 
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5. THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING TESTIMONY 
SHOWING THAT MORE THAN 50% OF ALL OF THE 
WATER WITHDRAWN BY THE IRRIGATION COM-
PANY WELLS WOULD BE WASTED. 
David I. Gardner, a civil engineer, testified at length as to 
evaporation from the Mona Reservoir and canal losses in 
getting the stored water to the place of use. Mr. Gardner 
concluded that approximately 7% of the water withdrawn 
from the underground basin would be lost by evaporation in 
transit to the reservoir; about 25% would be lost in the reser-
voir; and about 20% would be lost in the canal from the 
reservoir to the place of use (R. 57-62) . Evidence was intro-
duced to show that the use of the Irrigation Company wells 
was so wasteful, that it should not be permitted, where the 
result was to take it from others who suffered no such loss. 
Water pumped by the Andrews, and obtained by the Andrews 
and Fowkes from flowing wells and springs, is virtually used 
without waste. There is no evaporation from the underground 
basin and there is no transportation loss in getting the water 
from the Andrews wells and springs. They are right on the 
farm land. 
Upon objection to Mr. Gardner's testimony relating to 
evaporation and transit losses, the court ordered it stricken. 
We think that in any water adjudication the wastefulness of 
the use of water is always material; especially in such cases as 
this where the last comer opens the spigot in the basin at the 
lowest point and drains the water out for an irrigation use 
which wastes more than 50% of the water. The court's ruling 
that as long as there was water in the basin, the wastefulness 
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of any use was immaterial, was erroneous and constituted 
reversible. error. 
6. THE COURT'S ((SOLUTION" TO THE PROBLEM 
PRESENTED WAS ARBITRARY, INCOMPLETE AND 
WHOLLY INEFFECTUAL. 
The trial court was faced with a problem of vital concern 
to the parties which required a practical solution, in accordance 
with the law, not only for the present, but for the future as 
well. We believe that the amended decree is arbitrary, in-
complete and wholly ineffectual. 
The decree is arbitrary for several reasons. 
( 1) . It singles out the Fowkes rights of the same priority 
as the Andrews springs and flowing well rights, and orders 
replacement of the Fowkes rights and ignores the Andrews 
rights. 
( 2). It orders the replacement expenses to be uborne 
equally" by the Andrews and the Irrigation Company although 
(a) all Andrews rights are prior to the Irrigation Company 
rights, (b) there is no finding as to the quantity of water 
drawn by each, and (c) there is undisputed evidence in the 
record that until the Irrigation Company wells Nos. 3, 4 and 
5 were drilled in 1954 and allowed to flow continuously 
throughout the winter there \Vas no noticeable interference with 
the Fowkes wells. 
( 3) . There is no competent evidence supporting the 
quantity of \Vater required to be replaced. 
( 4) . The Court ignored the fact that other wells with-
draw water from the basin. 
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:~G: The decree is incomplete and ineffectual because it merely 
requires the Andrews and the Irrigation Company to pay the 
~~: expense of getting the water to the surface at this time, and 
:n ignores the necessity of establishing rights which can be ad-
ministered by the state engineer or other officer to govern 
water withdrawals in the future. If the present amended 
~: decree should be affirmed, there is nothing decided as between 
" the Andrews and the Irrigation Company which can guide the 
; ~. 
' state engineer in administering the water of the basin under 
~ '•, 
·~ the statutes quoted above. The court has overlooked the fact 
that each water right is relative, and that in a suit like this, 
where a general determination of rights is sought, there must 
be a workable plan for administration established. The court 
.. has not told the state engineer when to cut the later priorities 
to assure a full water supply for the prior users. Upon paying 
the expense of replacement, the later appropriators can con-
tinue to (tmine" the basin until it is not feasible to pump the 
water from the basin. As indicated above, further study is 
required to determine such vital matters as annual recharge 
and jurisdiction of the case should be retained until a sound 
basis is found for administration of the basin. 
CONCLUSION 
The Andrews had rights based on contract and the law, 
which were entitled to protection in this litigation. To give 
such protection, the Irrigation Company wells which opened 
a ccspigot" at the bottom of the basin and dried up old springs 
and flowing wells must be closed as provided by contract. The 
37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
burden of proof that such wells can be operated without im-
pairment of. the rights of -others was on the latest appropriator 
in the area, the Irrigation Company, and it failed to carry that 
burden. Any expense of further study should be borne by the 
Irrigation Company as directed by this Court in the case of 
Bastian v. Nebeker. 
We believe that 1n time of shortage, an underground 
basin must be administered by cutting off the junior rights 
in inverse order of priority. In these cases the trial court com-
pletely ignored the statutes on that subject, and refused to 
follow the fundamentals of the water law. All three cases must 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. J. SKEEN 
CARVEL MATTSSON 
Attorneys for the Andrews 
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